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The historical fertility transition at the micro level:  
Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
Tommy Bengtsson
1  
Martin Dribe
2 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
We know a great deal about the historical fertility transition at the macro level. The 
dominating  focus on the  macro level in previous research on the  fertility  transition 
means, however, that to a large extent we lack knowledge about details of the decline 
and empirical tests of the leading explanatory frameworks. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
Our  aim  is  to  explore  socioeconomic  fertility  differentials  in  an  industrializing 
community,  to gain insight about the details and discuss  possible  mechanisms. The 
study starts well before industrialization and finishes at the end of the transition.  
 
METHOD 
We  use  longitudinal  individual-level  data  from  the  Scanian  Economic-Demographic 
Database, which contains demographic as well as socioeconomic information, including 
occupation, landholding, and income. In the analysis we use hazard regressions with 
shared frailty at the family level. 
 
RESULTS 
The transition involved not only parity-specific stopping but also spacing. While the 
upper social strata had higher fertility prior to the transition, they started to control their 
fertility earlier, by the 1880s, and also more consistently. Farmers, the middle class, and 
skilled  workers  followed  in  the  decades  after,  and  unskilled  workers  with  some 
additional delay. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
These findings are  partly inconsistent  with several of the major explanations in the 
literature, such as mortality decline, increased female labor force participation, and a 
quantity-quality trade-off, but consistent with an innovation process where new ideas 
and attitudes about family limitation spread from the elite to other social groups.  
 
COMMENTS 
Further studies are required to empirically test the innovation-diffusion theory. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
One  of  the  major  demographic  changes  during  the  past  200  years  has  been  the 
emergence of the two-child norm as part of the creation of the modern family. In most 
parts of Western Europe this process started in the late nineteenth century and was 
completed by the 1930s. In Sweden marital fertility started to decline around 1880, and 
after  about  50  years,  total  fertility  had  declined  to  below  two  children  per  woman 
(Hofsten and Lundström 1976). Since then completed fertility has remained quite stable 
at around two births per woman, despite large variations in birth rates, giving empirical 
support for the two-child ideal of modern families.  
We know a great deal about the historical fertility transition at the macro level. It 
was  fairly  simultaneous  in  Western  Europe,  France  excluded,  starting  in  the  late 
nineteenth century, and earlier in urban areas than in rural. At the micro level we also 
know a great deal about fertility before the transition, but less on the transition itself, 
and even less integrating the pre-transitional period with the transition.  We therefore 
still  lack  a  fundamental  understanding  of  the  whole  process  of  fertility  decline  (cf. 
Guinnane  2011).  There  has  been  much  theorizing  and  generalization  of  empirical 
evidence  around  the  fertility  transition  with  a  number  of  influential  explanatory 
frameworks emerging. In most cases, however, the empirical support is rather weak. 
Examples include the quantity-quality trade-off, the cost-of-time hypotheses, and the 
innovation-diffusion  hypothesis,  as  well  as  mortality  decline  as  the  main  trigger  of 
fertility  decline.  Sometimes  the  hypothesis  in  itself  has  been  used  to  explain  other 
outcomes, as in the case of the quantity-quality trade-off, which has been viewed as 
instrumental  in  the  transition  from  preindustrial  economic  stagnation  to  modern 
economic growth (see Galor 2011). 
The aim of this paper is to look at fertility patterns by socioeconomic status before 
and during the fertility transition in order to gain new insights into the explanations of 
the  transition.  Rather  than  performing  direct  tests  of  different  hypotheses  about  the 
transition,  for  which  we  lack  sufficient  data,  we  will  discuss  likely  socioeconomic Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 17 
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patterns  that  could  be  derived  from  the  standard  explanations,  and  put  these  to  an 
empirical  test  using  high-quality  individual  level  data  with  information  on 
socioeconomic status derived from occupation and land holding. We study a changing 
community in southern Sweden which has developed from being a rural area to a mix 
of  rural  areas  and  a  small  town.  The  study  covers  the  period  1815-1939,  which 
encompasses the entire fertility transition, as well as a pre-transitional period of about 
60 years. 
The following section reviews the dominant explanations of the fertility transition, 
followed by a description of the context, data, methods, and the expected pattern of 
fertility  in  different  socioeconomic  groups  according  to  the  standard  explanatory 
frameworks. We then chart the fertility transition in the area and analyze the evolution 
of the socioeconomic fertility differentials, followed by a concluding discussion.  
 
 
2. Explanations of the fertility transition 
It is widely believed that fertility before the transition was not controlled but „natural‟, 
in the sense that childbearing was completely independent of the number of previous 
births (Henry 1961; see also, e.g., Cleland and Wilson 1985; Coale and Watkins 1986).
3 
There are different views concerning whether this was a result of lack of knowledge and 
social acceptance about birth control within marriage, or simply  the result of a high 
target family size, which in the face of high infant and child mortality was difficult to 
attain (see e.g., Coale 1973; Coale and Watkins 1986;  Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). 
From this perspective the fertility transition  started as couples began to stop having 
children after reaching a certain target family size (e.g., Coale and Watkins 1986). This 
made it crucial to look for indications of parity -specific stopping, and new measures 
were developed to reach this aim (e.g., Coale and Trussel 1974, 1978). However, due to 
a lack of information on stopping or even on  age-specific marital fertility, total marital 
fertility, and  sometimes even  crude birth rates   have  been used as  substitutes  for 
identifying the change in behavior .  This  was the case in the   early  work on  the 
demographic transition theory (Davis 1945; Notestein 1945), as well as in many of the 
analyses in the European Fertility Project (EFP) at Princeton University, which aimed at 
testing the theory of the demographic transition. EFP developed a set of new indices 
that did not require much in terms of data, which enabled them to chart the fertility 
decline at the regional level across Europe (see Coale and Watkins 1986 for a summary 
account).  
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While the demographic transition theory  stated that the decline in fertility  was 
caused by modernization (e.g. industrialization and urbanization) and falling infant and 
child mortality, the EFP found no support for these claims (Coale and Watkins 1986). 
Instead they argued that the fertility decline was largely due to the diffusion of social 
acceptance of family limitation, a fundamentally new behavior which did not exist in 
pre-transitional  society.  This  conclusion  was  based  on  the  observation  that  while 
economic development across Europe varied a lot at the time of the fertility transition, 
the  transition  itself  was  fairly  simultaneous.  This  was  also  demonstrated  by  cross-
sectional modeling of the effects of economic and social factors, such as urbanization, 
literacy, and workforce composition, on the level of fertility. Moreover, they showed 
that nearby areas with similar levels of industrialization sometimes had very different 
timings of fertility decline, which they connected to cultural and religious factors (e.g., 
Lesthaeghe 1977). Also, regarding the role of mortality decline, the results were largely 
negative. Comparing the declines in a number of countries, Van de Walle (1986) could 
not find a systematic pattern where mortality decline led to fertility decline.    
The  EFP  simply  could  not  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  decline  was 
independent  of  modernization  and  drew  the  conclusion  that  diffusion  of  social 
acceptance of family limitation was the key determinant of the fertility transition. Coale 
(1973) proposed three necessary conditions for fertility to change, namely that people 
were ready, willing, and able to do so (see also Lesthaeghe and Venderhoeft 2001). By 
readiness  is  meant  that  families  must  be  prepared  to  make  rational  decisions  about 
fertility,  willingness  is  connected  to  the  costs  and  benefits  of  having  children,  and 
ability is related to knowledge of methods to limit fertility. The EFP interpreted the 
empirical evidence as indicating that while both willingness and ability existed before 
the transition, readiness did not. Ideational factors, or diffusion of new attitudes towards 
family limitation, were instrumental in producing a rapid diffusion of family limitation 
across  Europe  (see  also  Cleland  2001;  Lesthaeghe  1980).  This  hypothesis  was, 
however,  never  explicitly  tested;  the  conclusion  was  largely  based  on  the  lack  of 
support for the modernization theory, as well as some empirical observations about 
fertility  differentials  by  language  group,  voting  behavior,  or  other  indicators  of 
secularization (Lesthaeghe 1977, 1980; Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986). 
Subsequent  research  has  tended  to  question  most  aspects  of  EFP:  the  basic 
empirical picture of a simultaneous decline, the methods used (Brown and Guinnane 
2007), the negative results on the importance of socioeconomic change (Brown and 
Guinnane  2002;  Dribe  2009;  Galloway,  Hammel,  and  Lee  1994;  Richards  1977; 
Sogner, Randsborg, and Fure 1984), and on previous mortality decline (Galloway, Lee, 
and Hammel 1998; Reher 1999, Reher and Sanz-Gimeno 2007). There has also been 
questioning of the claim that families in pre-transitional Europe did not deliberately 
control  their  fertility.  Studies  of  age-specific  marital  fertility  in  Rouen  and  Geneva Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 17 
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show that family size was controlled long before the fertility transition (Bardet 1990; 
Perrenoud  1990).  Similarly,  in  several  German  villages  couples  married  in  the 
beginning of the nineteenth century practiced fertility control (Knodel 1988:289). An 
early rural decline, preceding neighboring cities, is also observed for Hungary (Andorka 
1972). Other studies  have demonstrated the existence of  non-parity-specific  fertility 
control in pre-industrial Western societies, which shows that people were acting on 
incentives  well  before  the  decline  began  (e.g.,  Bean,  Mineau,  and  Anderton  1990; 
Bengtsson and Dribe 2006; David and Mroz 1989a, 1989b; Dribe and Scalone 2010; 
Van Bavel 2004). This has also led to the conclusion that birth spacing, and not only 
stopping, was an important component in explaining the fertility transition (Anderson 
1998; Bean, Mineau, and Anderton 1990; Bengtsson and Ohlsson 1994; Crafts 1989; 
David and Sanderson 1986; Haines 1989; Szreter 1996). Of course, the fact that people 
sometimes deliberately controlled their fertility cannot be taken as evidence that people 
were  ready  to  limit  family  size,  but  supports  the  idea  of  agency  in  reproductive 
decision-making long before the fertility decline (cf. Tsuya, Feng, and Lee 2010). 
There has been considerable theorizing about the fertility transition, and different 
explanatory frameworks have been proposed. One influential theory, already mentioned 
in relation to the EFP, is innovation diffusion, or, more loosely, ideational change. The 
basic premise of this framework is that people in the past were not completely ready to 
limit family size even though they might have been both willing and able, in the sense 
that they had economic and demographic reasons to limit family size as well as the 
necessary knowledge to do so. What was required was a change in attitudes making it 
socially acceptable to limit fertility within marriage (see Carlsson 1966; Cleland 2001; 
Cleland  and  Wilson  1987;  Lesthaeghe  1980;  Lesthaeghe  and  Surkyn  1988).  In  this 
process better knowledge about contraceptive methods may also have played a part. 
Even  though  most  scholars  seem  to  assume  that  knowledge  of  basic  contraception 
through traditional methods were known to people, it remains uncertain to what extent 
they were used within marriage (McLaren 1990; Santow 1995; Van de Walle 2000; 
Van de Walle and Muhsam 1995). In any case, the distinction between readiness and 
ability is crucial. The mere fact that people were able to limit fertility does not mean 
that they were ready to do so. For this to happen there had to be social acceptance of 
limiting  the  number  of  children  within  marriage,  and  according  to  the  innovation-
diffusion  paradigm  this  was  largely  not  the  case  in  pre-transitional  society.  Hence, 
diffusion of new norms, values, and attitudes towards family limitation might have been 
an important part of the fertility decline as it affected people‟s readiness to adopt new 
behavior. It is more difficult to find out how these new attitudes came about and spread 
through society. In his theory of innovation-diffusion more generally, Rogers (1962) 
identified five groups in the diffusion process with strong links to socioeconomic status: 
innovators (highest SES), early adopters (high SES), early majority (average SES), late Bengtsson & Dribe: The historical fertility transition at the micro level: Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
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majority (below average SES), and laggards (lowest SES). Viewing deliberate family 
limitation within marriage as an innovation (e.g., Cleland 2001), we would then expect 
to find a clear gradient in the decline of marital fertility, going from highest to lowest 
socioeconomic status. What is not as clear, however, is how to explain the innovation in 
the first place, i.e., why the innovators suddenly decided to start to do things differently 
and limit their family  size.  One possibility, introduced by Easterlin (1975; see also 
Easterlin and Crimmins 1985), is to view these aspects as a cost of fertility regulation, 
which could delay the fertility decline because the social or emotional costs of family 
limitation were too high. Not until these costs declined following a universal acceptance 
of deliberate birth control within marriage would actual fertility be adjusted to the new 
circumstances.  A  similar  view  underlies  Coale‟s  (1973)  formulation  about  people 
needing  to  be  ready,  willing,  and  able  for  fertility  decline  to  commence  (see  also 
Lesthaeghe 1980; Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001). Furthermore, it is unclear what 
factors explain the time lag between different groups, and whether the lag is in terms of 
months, years, or decades. 
There are a number of theories focusing on the demand for children as crucial in 
explaining fertility in general and the historic decline in particular (e.g., Becker 1981; 
Caldwell 1982; Easterlin 1975; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985; Leibenstein 1957, 1975). 
The demand for children is determined both by the benefits of children and by their 
costs. In terms of benefits the direct productive contribution of children could have been 
important in agricultural and early industrial societies where children often started to 
work early (e.g., Humphries 2010). Legislation to limit child labor could therefore have 
influenced the direct costs of children, even though it seems, at least in Sweden, that 
child labor became unprofitable well before the change in labor laws (Olsson 1980). 
Regardless of the reason, a lower labor contribution by children should act to lower the 
demand for them.  
Children  could  also  have  been  a  benefit  to  their  parents  as  a  form  of  social 
insurance and old-age support (Easterlin 1976, see also Sundstrom and David 1988). 
The development of welfare institutions, such as unemployment benefits and pension 
systems, should then have reduced these benefits, which could have contributed to a 
lower demand for children, and thus to fertility decline.  
Turning  to  the  cost  of  children,  two  main  hypotheses  have  emerged  from  the 
economic fertility models, the „cost-of-time hypothesis‟ and the „quantity-quality trade-
off hypothesis‟. The cost-of-time hypothesis emphasizes the increasing indirect costs of 
children, stemming from women‟s employment outside the household (Mincer 1963). 
Increased labor force participation of married women and higher female relative wages 
increased opportunity costs of children and thus reduced the demand for them. The 
main  question  here  is  the  extent  to  which  the  labor  force  participation  of  married Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 17 
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women really increased in the period of fertility decline. We will return to this question 
when discussing the context of our analysis.     
The quantity-quality trade-off hypothesis emphasizes the direct costs of children 
related  to  increased  demand  for  education  as  the  result  of  a  shift  in  consumption 
towards industrial goods, produced by a better-educated labor force. Assuming a budget 
constraint, this led families to reduce their fertility and to invest more in each child: in 
other words, to substitute quantity for quality (Becker 1981). This trade-off has been 
seen as an important cause of the transition from so-called Malthusian stagnation to 
modern  economic  growth  (Galor  2005,  2011;  see  also  Becker,  Cinnirella,  and 
Woessmann 2010). 
Finally,  mortality  decline  has  often  been  seen  as  an  important  explanation  for 
fertility decline, which goes back at least to the first formulations of the theory of the 
demographic transition (Davis 1945; Notestein 1945; see also Van de Walle 1986). In 
the synthetic  model developed by Easterlin (1975;  see also Easterlin and Crimmins 
1985) mortality decline is crucial in affecting the supply of children, defined as the 
number of surviving children a couple would get if they made no conscious efforts to 
limit the size of the family. Thus it reflects natural fertility as well as child survival. 
High child mortality constitutes a limit on this potential supply; additionally, cultural 
factors outside the immediate control of the family, such as breastfeeding practices, 
which influence the level of natural fertility, might also impose such a limit. Declining 
mortality  in  the  first  phase  of  the  demographic  transition  changed  the  supply  of 
children, and this was one important factor in the fertility decline (see also Dyson 2010; 
and Reher 1999 for similar views).   
Taken  together,  there  are  explanatory  frameworks  of  varying  levels  of 
sophistication that try to explain the fertility transition by factors associated with the 
demand and supply of children as well as with the degree of social acceptance of family 
limitation.  From  a  theoretical  point  of  view  they  are  complementary  rather  than 
competing, and in principle they could all contribute to the explanation (see Casterline 
2001). The problem has always been to actually test them in historical contexts. As 
aforementioned,  there  is  evidence  from  macro-level  data  supporting  all  of  these 
explanations, but most tests are quite weak, with uncertainty as to what extent factors 
like expansion of education, increased female work, declining mortality, development 
of  pension  schemes,  or  new  attitudes  and  better  knowledge  of  contraception  were 
actually important. In this study we will use the socioeconomic differences in fertility 
before and during the transition to gain new insights into the likely contribution of these 
explanations. In order to form hypotheses about the expected socioeconomic pattern, 
which can later be tested empirically, we first need to present the context we will be 
exploring. 
 Bengtsson & Dribe: The historical fertility transition at the micro level: Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
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3. The context 
This paper focuses on a rural area in southern Sweden which was homogenous in terms 
of religion. Almost the entire population belonged to the Lutheran state church, which 
makes  religious  denomination  a  less  likely  determinant  of  fertility  decline  in  this 
context (cf. Derosas and Van Poppel 2006). It is located about ten kilometers from the 
coast in the western parts of Scania, which is the southernmost province of Sweden. 
The five parishes we studied had 3,900 inhabitants in 1830. By the end of 1939 that 
figure had increased to 6,300, which implies roughly the same rate of growth as in 
Sweden as a  whole. The growth in the  five parishes  was, however, very  unequally 
distributed, as 91% took place in Kävlinge, which was transformed from a rural village 
to a small industrial town with several factories and railroad connections (see Dribe, 
Helgertz, and Van de Putte, forthcoming). Life expectancy at birth followed the same 
development as in Sweden as a whole, but was about one year higher (Bengtsson 2004). 
Fertility was also slightly higher than in Sweden as a whole but followed the same 
patterns over time. 
The  selected  parishes  are  compact  in  their  geographical  location,  showing  the 
variations  that  could  occur  in  a  society  with  regard  to  size,  topography,  and 
socioeconomic  conditions.  The  entire  area  was  open  farmland,  except  for  parts  of 
Kågeröd,  which  were  more  wooded.  Sireköpinge,  Halmstad,  and  Kågeröd  were 
predominantly manorial parishes, while freehold and crown land dominated in Kävlinge 
and Hög.  
Sweden,  like  the  rest  of  Western  Europe,  underwent  fundamental  changes  in 
economic  structure  from  the  mid-nineteenth  century  onwards.  The  manufacturing 
industry grew rapidly and the agricultural sector was rationalized. After about 1900 the 
service  sector  started  to  grow  as  well.  This  meant  that  the  employment  structure 
underwent large changes within a short time period, and by 1940 the number employed 
in  industry  was  higher  than  in  agriculture  (Jungenfeldt  1966:  Table  1).  As 
industrialization was mainly an urban phenomenon almost all towns in Sweden grew 
during this period. Still, despite this economic development, the growth of the labor 
force was not fully absorbed and large-scale emigration, primarily to the United States, 
took  place.  In  addition,  both  the  beginning  of  the  1920s  and  the  1930s  saw  mass 
unemployment, peaking at 27% in 1921 (Silenstam 1970, Table A:19). The rural area 
within the study saw all parts of this development except large-scale emigration. Not 
only  did  the  agricultural  sector  change  but  some  industries  developed  as  well, 
particularly in one of the parishes, Kävlinge, located along one of the main railroad 
lines. 
The increasing competition from imported agricultural products made producers 
aware of the importance of rationalization and technical change. Mechanization was an Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 17 
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important way to be competitive and meetings were held to show the latest news in 
terms of agricultural machinery.
4 By 1900 an investigation based on estate inventories 
of farms throughout the country showed that, as a result of the intensive mechanization 
process, machinery was used in almost all parts of the production process , more so in 
the  plain  areas,  including  Scania  (Moberg  1987 :133,  1989:214-217).
5  As  a 
consequence,  the  number  of  workers  involved  in  vegetable  production  decreased 
despite an increase in production, the productivity increase being even higher in animal 
production. 
The intensive development of agriculture and industrialization implied not only 
investments  in  factories  and  machinery  but  also  in  education.  From  being  the 
responsibility of the clergymen since   1686,  in 1842  it became mandatory for all 
communities to have a  school, although schools often started well before this time. It 
was, however, not until 1882 that  school attendance became mandatory  (see Lirén 
1986;  Richardson  1994 ).  By  then  most  children  in  Sweden  already  had   a  basic 
knowledge of both reading and writing (see Nilsson and Svärd 1994; Svensson 2006). 
However, even after it became mandatory , school was half-time and stayed so for a 
long time. Many families, especially in rural areas where child labor was not abandoned 
until 1936 (1944 for home work) did not send their children to school as much as the y 
were obliged too, simply because schools could be far away and child labor was a 
welcome supplement to the labor and income of the family (Sjöberg 1996:93). This is 
why,  as late as the 1920s ,  farmers  protested against the mand atory school system 
(Sjöberg 1996:1). This is also why even the children of the  members of the  school 
boards  had  a  high  degree  of  absence  (Sjöberg  1996 :55-56).  Even  though  the 
quantitative  measures  of  income  from  children   are  very  limited,  we  have  some 
examples  where  the  share  of  family  labor  earnings  coming  from  children  varies 
between 4% and 62% around 1890 (von Feilitzen  189092, cited by Sjöberg 2004: 
Table 10). 
In  addition,  secondary  schooling  developed  in  various  forms  (national,  local 
community, or private). The number of local secondary schools for both boys and girls 
in Sweden increased from 2 in 1910 to 40 in 1918 (SOS 1919). Still, few went for any 
education above the basic level of 6 years of primary school. In fact only about 4% of 
all  children  were  taught  in  secondary  schools  in  the  period  19201939  and  in  the 
countryside  the  figure  was  below  1.5%  (Statistics  Sweden  1974:4,  Tables  1.6  and 
                                                            
4 At the first national meeting, held in Stockholm in 1846, only 24 machines were displayed, a figure that 
increased rapidly; by 1881 at the meeting in Malmö the number of machines on display was 1,600. 
5 The number of workers involved in vegetable production decreased by 22 % between 1876-1885 to 1930-
1939, despite an increase in production  of 94% (measured in calories). In animal production the number of 
workers decreased by 42% and production went up by 213% (SOU 1966(30):86; see also Hellström 1976:  
App 5). Bengtsson & Dribe: The historical fertility transition at the micro level: Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
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1.6:96). As a result only 1.9% of all 19-year olds had a high school degree in 1930, and 
only 3.6% of 16-year olds had nine years of schooling (Stanfors 2007: 181). This is not 
to say that no education at all took place after the sixth school year, since there were 
also various forms of vocational schooling and training. This type of schooling was, 
however,  of  shorter  duration  and  therefore  less  costly.  Furthermore  it  did  not  give 
access to tertiary education. Thus the cost of education was the same for almost all 
parents, except perhaps in the highest social class where the budget constraint was less 
tight. 
Child labor was common, even at very young ages, and it was not until 1833 that it 
was forbidden to employ children below age 9. This then changed again in 1912 to 13 
years (Olsson 1980). In 1875 about 5% of the industrial labor force was below 14, 
including 20% of the glass manufacturing industry (Olsson 1980:50). In addition, many 
children worked as agricultural laborers, either on the home farm or elsewhere, and in 
1913 the legal maximum number of working hours for children over 13 increased to 60 
hours per week. Starting to work at age 13 was common until the school reforms of the 
1950s and 60s (Orring 1967: Diagram 1). Children normally did not leave home until 
after age 15 or 16 (see Dribe 2000), and were under the guardianship of their fathers for 
much longer. While the lawful age for men was 21 years during the entire period we 
analyzed, it changed for women: it was not until 1863 that they became lawful, then at 
age 25 years and only until they married. The lawful age was changed to 21 years for 
women in 1884 but it was not until 1921 that they remained lawful after marriage. This 
means that parents (fathers) often had control of labor contracts and the income of their 
children for a period of eight to twelve years of their working lives. Nonetheless, it 
remains highly uncertain if children really were of net benefit to their parents when 
looking at the whole period from birth until full independence (see, e.g., Lee 2003; 
Sullivan Robinson, Lee, and Kramer 2008 for developing countries). 
The inheritance laws also changed in this period. While sons and daughters of the 
bourgeoisie  and  the  clergymen  had  inherited  equally  since  the  Middle  Ages,  the 
daughters‟ share was only one third among the farmers and lower classes. This changed 
with a new law in 1845 with equal inheritance between the sexes for everyone, except 
for children born out of wedlock (Inger 2011:254). 
Turning to welfare systems, poor relief was organized by the local communities at 
the beginning of the period, but only a small fraction of the population received this 
before the national welfare system emerged (for an overview, see Bengtsson 2004). The 
state pension system from 1913 was the first in the world to be universal, meaning that 
it  covered  the  entire  working  population  and  not  only  industrial  workers.  In  the 
beginning the pension was very low. The benefits, which were based on contributions, 
gave a pension of approximately 20% of an average income for workers. It grew over 
time, and additional dimensions such as work injury insurance were added in the 1920s. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 17 
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With the pension reform of 1946 retired workers could for the first time live on their 
pensions (see Bengtsson and Fridlizius 1994; Edebalk 1996). 
 
 
4. Data and methods 
The data used is based on local population registers in combination with church records 
for five parishes (Hög, Kävlinge, Sireköpinge, Halmstad, and Kågeröd), which include 
information on demographic events and migration for all members of households, and 
families within households.
6 The vital events have also been checked against the birth 
and death registers to adjust for possible under -recording of events in the population 
registers. In this paper we use da ta from about 1815, when the population registers 
begin, to 1939, when the fertility transition in Sweden was completed and a period of 
increasing fertility was about to begin (the baby boom). The data from the population 
registers have also been linked to   poll-tax registers ( mantalslängder)  and  income 
registers  which  provide  yearly  information  on  occupation.  The  resulting  database 
contains all individuals born in the different parishes, or migrating into them. Instead of 
sampling any particular group (a birth cohort for example), each individual is followed 
from birth or time of arrival in the parish, to death or migration out of the parish. 
In the first part of the analysis we chart the fertility transition in the area, looking 
at general marital fertility rates (for women aged 1549), age-specific marital fertility 
rates,  SES-specific  fertility  rates,  and  mean  birth  intervals  over  the  period  from 
18151939.  The  rates  were  calculated  for  the  entire  population  of  married  women 
residing in the parishes. Women are followed in-migration (as married) or marriage, 
until death, out-migration, or turning 50. 
We then turn to a multivariate analysis mainly aimed at analyzing the development 
of socioeconomic differences in marital fertility in the fertility transition, controlling for 
a basic set of covariates. The analysis is made separately for first births and higher-
order births because the timing of first births is likely to be influenced by the same 
factors as the marriage itself. We use piecewise constant exponential hazard models 
(see, e.g., Blossfeld, Golsch, and Rohwer 2007) with shared frailty at the individual 
(woman) level to account for repeated events for the same woman (in the analysis of 
higher-order births). The frailty factor is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution. We 
use six-month time periods for the baseline hazard, which gives a high flexibility and 
thus does not impose severe restrictions on the shape of the baseline hazard function 
                                                            
6 The data is maintained by the Scanian Economic-Demographic Database, which is a collaborative project 
between the Regional Archives in Lund and the Centre for Economic Demography, Lund University. We 
have used version 3.0 (Bengtsson, Dribe, and Svensson 2012). Bengtsson & Dribe: The historical fertility transition at the micro level: Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
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(using three-month time periods produced practically identical results and comparisons 
with the Cox model also showed very similar parameter estimates). For first births the 
duration  is  time  since  marriage,  and  only  women  for  whom  we  observe  their  first 
marriage are included in the sample. 
When it comes to second and higher-order births we analyze all birth intervals 
simultaneously instead of focusing on stopping by, for example, looking only at the 
third or the fourth birth. This is justified from earlier results indicating that the fertility 
decline in Sweden was not solely a matter of stopping but more of a reduction in births 
over the entire reproductive period (Bengtsson and Ohlsson 1994; Dribe 2009, see also 
Figure 2 below). In this analysis the duration is time since last birth and in-migrating 
women are included in the sample from the first observed birth onwards (although this 
birth is of course not included in the analysis as an event).  Due to the high rates of 
migration in the area under study (e.g., Dribe 2003) we would expect some selection 
bias as well as a much smaller sample size had only women who could be followed 
from marriage onwards been included in the analysis. However, it also means that it is 
impossible to include parity as a covariate because this information is lacking for in-
migrants.  
We  estimate  a  basic  model  including  socioeconomic  status,  life  status  of  the 
previously born child, time period, age at marriage (first births), age of woman (higher-
order  births),  and  parish  of  residence.  We  also  estimate  an  extended  model,  which 
includes interactions between period and socioeconomic status. These models test how 
socioeconomic differences evolved over time and which groups led or lagged in the 
decline of fertility. All covariates, except age at marriage, are time-varying. We divide 
the period of analysis into four distinct periods corresponding to the different phases of 
the fertility transition: 18151879 (pre-transitional), 1880-1904 (early transition), 1905-
1919 (mid transition), and 19201939 (late transition). In addition  we control for a 
linear trend within these periods to see if the other covariates are able to pick up the 
decline in fertility or not.  
Socioeconomic  status  is  measured  by  the  occupation  of  the  family  head  (the 
husband). We have coded all occupations in the database into HISCO (Van Leeuwen, 
Maas,  and  Miles  2002),  and  then  classified  them  according  to  HISCLASS  (Van 
Leeuven and Maas 2011), which is a 12-category classification scheme based on skill 
level,  degree  of  supervision,  whether  manual  or  non-manual,  and  whether  urban  or 
rural. It contains the following classes: 1) Higher managers, 2) Higher professionals, 3) 
Lower managers, 4) Lower professionals and clerical and sales personnel, 5) Lower 
clerical and sales personnel, 6) Foremen, 7) Medium-skilled workers, 8) Farmers and 
fishermen, 9) Lower-skilled workers, 10) Lower-skilled farm workers, 11) Unskilled 
workers, 12) Unskilled farm workers. These twelve classes were grouped into six: Elite 
(1+2), Middle class (3+4+5), Skilled workers (6+7), Farmers and fishermen (8), Lower-Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 17 
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skilled workers (9+10), and Unskilled workers (11+12). The elite includes occupations 
like higher officials and military, factory owners, bank managers, doctors, dentists, and 
clergymen, while the middle class includes shop owners, merchants, teachers, etc.
7 
In addition to occupational data we have used landholding information from poll-
tax registers  to distinguish farmers  with land at or above subsistence level from 
smallholders. Only the former group was categorized as farmers while the latter was 
classified as lower-skilled workers. Similar to previous research, we u sed 1/16 of a 
mantal (an old land measure used in Swedish sources) as the subsistence level (see the 
discussion in Dribe 2000).  
Table  1  shows  the  distribution  of  these  classes  for  the  full  sample  of  married 
women aged 1549. Overall there was an increase over time in the proportion of the 
higher classes: the elite increased from about 2.5% to 5% between the first and last 
period, and the middle class from 4% to 15%. The proportion of skilled workers also 
increased substantially, while the proportion of farmers declined from 35% to 22%. The 
share  of  lower-skilled  workers  (including  smallholders,  crofters  etc.)  also  declined, 
while the proportion of unskilled workers remained quite stable. 
 
 
Table 1:  Distribution (%) of socioeconomic status of the family head in the full 
sample 
  1815-1879  1880-1904  1905-1919  1920-1939 
Elite  2.5  3.5  3.1  4.6 
Middle class  4.1  9.6  14.4  15.3 
Skilled  8.0  15.4  17.0  15.9 
Farmers  35.4  22.0  17.5  22.0 
Lower-skilled  31.0  24.2  24.8  23.5 
Unskilled  18.0  19.7  20.9  16.4 
NA  1.0  5.6  2.4  2.4 
 
        Total  100  100  100  100 
Time at risk  25351  12900  10449  15422 
 
Note: The sample contains all married women 15-49 years. 
 
   
                                                            
7 The fundamental conclusions of the analysis do not depend on the choice of class scheme. Similar results 
were obtained using SOCPO (Van de Putte and Miles 2005). Bengtsson & Dribe: The historical fertility transition at the micro level: Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
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Life status of the previous child is included to measure the impact of child death 
on fertility; in other words, if child deaths induced parents to compensate by having 
another birth (replacement). This serves to indicate the importance of infant and child 
mortality for fertility. If there was a clear and consistent association between the two, a 
decline in infant and child mortality may have contributed to fertility decline, as has 
been postulated in much previous research. 
 
 
5. Expected fertility patterns by socioeconomic status 
Based on the theories and previous empirical generalizations discussed we can form 
expectations about the likely socioeconomic pattern of fertility decline according to the 
different  frameworks.  We  will  group  explanations  under  five  different  headings: 
benefits  of  children,  cost-of-time,  quantity-quality  trade-off,  mortality  decline,  and 
ideational factors. 
The  direct  labor  contribution  of  children  was  probably  largest  and  most  long-
lasting  in  the  agricultural  sector  and  especially  among  the  farmers,  as  they  had  a 
demand for the labor of their children. The gradual decline of child labor quite early on 
in the industrialization process made it more difficult for children to get a job, and 
therefore the direct benefits of children declined (Olsson 1980; see also Cunningham 
and Viazzo 1996). Among the elite and upper middle classes we do not expect children 
to  have  worked  for  wages  to  any  greater  extent,  thereby  not  constituting  economic 
benefits to their parents. Thus, from this perspective we would expect a later decline in 
fertility for farmers, and perhaps for agricultural laborers. 
In terms of security in old age and in times of low income due to unemployment 
etc.,  we  would  expect  people  of  lower  means  to  have  been  most  in  need  of  such 
transfers, as they had no assets to live off. This would imply that the extent to which the 
emerging welfare institutions had any effect on fertility decisions in the period we are 
studying should mainly affect the lower classes, and only towards the very end of the 
transition.  Hence,  a  late  decline  in  fertility  in  the  lower-status  groups  would  be 
consistent with this explanation. 
According  to  the  cost-of-time  hypothesis  we  expect  women‟s  work  to  have 
increased the cost of children, especially in cases where they work outside the home, 
where combining work with looking after children was difficult. From census data we 
know that the level of labor force participation among married women was very low 
during  the  period  of  concern;  in  1920,  for  example,  it  was  only  4%  (Silenstam 
1970:58). Most likely, however, many married women did various kinds of work to 
supplement family income without this being recorded in the sources, which makes the 
census figures gross underestimates of the extent of women‟s work outside the home in Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 17 
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this  period  (see  Humphries  and  Sarasúa  2012).  We  can  safely  assume  that  such 
supplementary labor was much more frequent in the working classes, while the elite and 
middle  class  wives  rarely  worked  for  wages  outside  the  home.  Hence,  from  this 
perspective we would expect an early decline in the laboring classes, who would have 
been mainly affected by these increased costs. 
Even though the elite groups were the first to provide their children with higher 
education, we do not expect them to have had a tight budget constraint, thereby not 
facing a strong trade-off between the quantity and quality of their offspring. In addition 
to an educational career, the military offered alternative career paths which came at no 
cost to the parents. Instead we expect the growing middle class of the nineteenth and 
early  twentieth  century  to  have  faced  the  strongest  trade-off.  Education  became  an 
increasingly important instrument for socioeconomic advancement (see Dribe, Helgertz, 
and Van de Putte, forthcoming) and middle class families can be expected to have had 
high aspirations for their children,  without having the  means to provide for a large 
number of them. We would therefore assume that they opted for fewer children, while 
investing more in each of them. Hence, from this theory we would expect the middle 
class to have had an early fertility decline. 
In order to form expectations about the impact of mortality decline on fertility we 
need information about socioeconomic differences in mortality in this period. While it 
is clear that more pronounced socioeconomic differentials  in adult mortality did not 
appear until well after our period ends (Bengtsson and Dribe 2011) it is more unclear 
for children, even though estimates from the area under study point to a similar time 
profile in the decline of infant and child mortality in different socioeconomic groups, 
perhaps with a somewhat earlier decline in the elite middle class (see Figure 1). The 
differences were only minor, however, which leads to the conclusion that we should not 
expect much of socioeconomic differences in the timing of the fertility decline based on 
the mortality development. 
   Bengtsson & Dribe: The historical fertility transition at the micro level: Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
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Figure 1:  Proportion of children dying before age 5 by year of birth and SES 
 
 
 
Based  on  the  theories  of  the  diffusion  of  new  ideas  and  behavior  discussed 
previously, we expect this kind of process to have started in the upper classes, then to 
have  gradually  diffused  to  the  middle  classes,  and  later  also  to  the  working  class 
(Rogers 1962; see also Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Shorter 1975). An early decline 
among the elite groups, followed by the  middle classes, the farmers, and lastly  the 
working  classes,  would  clearly  be  consistent  with  this  kind  of  diffusion  process. 
Similarly, Szreter‟s (1996) idea about communicating communities, where geography 
and class interact to form specific fertility discourses, seems consistent with this more 
rapid and early diffusion among the elite groups. These groups normally interacted over 
longer distances, which should have increased the pace of the decline and made it less 
geographically constrained (see also Klüsener, Scalone, and Dribe 2013).   
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6. The fertility transition in the Scanian communities 
Figure 2 shows the general marital fertility rate (births to married women divided by the 
person years at risk for married women 1549 years) annually from 18151939. It is 
quite  clear  that  there  was  not  much  trend  in  marital  fertility  during  most  of  the 
nineteenth century. During the 1890s fertility suddenly declined, and once the decline 
started it continued uninterrupted until the mid-1930s. This is basically the same pattern 
as for Sweden as a whole, although the decline started about ten years later in Scania 
(see Hofsten and Lundström 1976). Fertility started to decline at about the same time 
for older and younger women. 
 
 
Figure 2:  General marital fertility rates (15-49) in the Scanian sample 
18151939 
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Figure 3 pictures the development of age-specific marital fertility for subsequent 
time periods. The fertility transition is clearly visible in the graphs, with a lowering of 
marital fertility in all age groups. It is difficult from only visual inspection to determine 
if this reduction  was due to  prolonged birth intervals or parity-specific  stopping.  A 
common way to indicate stopping has been to use the Coale-Trussel model (Coale and 
Trussel 1974, 1978).
8 Table 2 reports estimates of the m and M parameters using t he 
age-specific schedules from Figure 3. Values of m over 0.20.3 are usually taken to 
indicate the presence of parity-specific fertility control. By this measure fertility appears 
to have been controlled in this way at least by the 1880s, which also accords quite well 
with national and regional level data (Dribe 2009). 
 
Figure 3:  Age-specific marital fertility rates by period in the Scanian sample 
 
 
   
                                                            
8Although there have been numerous criticisms of this way of modeling natural fertility, and although several 
alternative formulations and estimation techniques have been proposed and presented, it has survived to 
become widespread, probably because of its simplicity and thus its value for comparisons (see, e.g., Page 
1977; Broström 1985; Wilson, Oeppen, and Pardoe 1988). Mainly for reasons of comparison the standard 
formulation devised by Coale and Trussell has been used, by which m and M are estimated by ordinary least 
squares regression. 
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Table 2:  Coale-Trussel m and M in the Scanian sample by period 
 
M  p-value  m  p-value 
1815-1879  1.00  0.960  0.13  0.054 
1880-1904  1.01  0.840  0.30  0.009 
1905-1919  0.84  0.043  0.44  0.001 
1920-1939  0.56  0.003  0.54  0.003 
 
Note: Parameters estimated by OLS. P-value for M refer to the test of ln(M)=0. 
 
 
The fact that parity-specific control was one mechanism in the decline should not 
lead  us  to  rule  out  the  importance  of  prolonged  birth  intervals  for  the  decline,  as 
previously  argued.  As  is  clear  from  Table  4,  mean  birth  intervals  also  increased 
considerably in the fertility decline, pointing to the important role played by spacing in 
the fertility transition, something that has also been stressed for other countries (e.g., 
Bean, Mineau, and Anderton 1990; Szreter 1996).
9 The long-term increase is  equally 
visible for higher-order births and from marriage to first birth. In both cases it increased 
by six months. 
Figure 4 displays the marital fertility rates (1549) by socioeconomic status of the 
family head by time period. Looking at the pre-transitional period as a whole (before 
1860), the elite had high fertility, and the lower-skilled had the lowest. From the 1860s 
onwards fertility dropped quickly among the elite, and from about 1880 also among the 
middle class and skilled workers, while it remained stable for the lower classes and 
farmers. From 1900 onwards fertility declined in all socioeconomic groups. The pattern 
over time indicates a period of widening socioeconomic differences during the initial 
period of the decline, from about 1880 to 19101920. From then on the decline was 
fairly simultaneous, in which the temporal decline common to all groups was much 
more  pronounced  than  the  socioeconomic  differentials.  Thus,  the  fertility  transition 
started among the elite and then spread to the middle class and skilled workers, and 
finally to the rest of the groups. Once it had started, the pace of change was similar for 
different socio-economic groups. 
 
   
                                                            
9 An increase in the intensity and length of breastfeeding could potentially be part of the prolongation of birth 
intervals. Breastfeeding was, however, already common in in our study area, as well as throughout most of 
the country, before the fertility transitions started (Brändström 1984: Figure 32). Thus it cannot be a major 
factor in explaining the fertility decline. Bengtsson & Dribe: The historical fertility transition at the micro level: Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
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Figure 4:  Marital fertility by SES in the Scanian sample 18151939 
 
 
 
Mean  birth  intervals  by  socioeconomic  status,  reported  in  Table  3,  show  a 
considerable increase not only in the length of higher birth intervals but also in the 
interval from marriage to first birth in all groups, with temporal intermissions only for 
certain socioeconomic groups. Although some of the increase for higher-order births 
could be connected to failed stopping (couples having unplanned children after deciding 
to limit family size), the highly similar pattern for first births points to prolonged birth 
intervals („spacing‟) as an important aspect of the fertility transition in all social groups 
and in all age groups (cf. Bean, Mineau, and Anderton 1990; Szreter 1996). 
These  kinds  of  aggregated  measures  are  difficult  to  interpret,  however,  as 
socioeconomic differentials might be concealed by compositional effects in terms of 
age, proportions childless, etc. Factors affecting first births are likely to differ from 
factors affecting higher-order births, due to differences in frequencies of pre-nuptial 
pregnancies, or the relation between the marriage decision and the decision to enter into 
parenthood more generally. Hence, in the analysis we distinguish between the first birth 
interval (marriage to first birth) and higher-order intervals.  
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Table 3:  Mean previous birth interval (years) by period and socioeconomic 
status 
  A:  First Births 
 
1815-1879  1880-1904  1905-1919  1920-1939  1815-1939  N 
Elite  0.84  1.25  0.85  0.77  0.92  36 
Middle class  1.95  1.10  1.14  2.28  1.71  108 
Skilled  1.12  1.10  0.91  1.27  1.12  207 
Farmers  1.21  1.80  1.23  1.99  1.44  367 
Lower-skilled  1.28  0.88  1.33  1.59  1.27  402 
Unskilled  0.58  1.06  0.87  1.27  0.79  375 
             
All  1.06  1.18  1.13  1.61  1.19 
 
N  778  285  165  267  1495 
 
 
  B:   Higher-order births 
  1815-1879  1880-1904  1905-1919  1920-1939  1815-1939  N 
Elite  2.24  3.34  2.75  3.01  2.57  229 
Middle class  2.42  2.67  2.79  3.54  2.76  622 
Skilled  2.70  2.31  3.04  3.40  2.72  1073 
Farmers  2.61  2.60  2.66  3.00  2.65  2691 
Lower-skilled  2.80  2.60  2.85  3.33  2.81  2277 
Unskilled  2.78  2.70  2.74  3.36  2.83  1547 
             
All  2.68  2.58  2.82  3.27  2.74 
 
N  4701  1808  1060  870  8439 
 
 
 
7. Event-history analysis of birth intervals 
Table 4 reports the distribution of the covariates used in the hazard models, and Table 5 
displays the relative risks estimated separately for first births and higher-order births. 
The two samples look fairly similar in terms of the distribution of socioeconomic status. 
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Table 4:  Distribution of covariates (based on population at risk) 
 
First births  Higher-order births 
SES 
    Elite  0.03  0.03 
Middle class  0.09  0.09 
Skilled  0.14  0.13 
Farmers  0.26  0.29 
Lower-skilled  0.30  0.28 
Unskilled  0.19  0.18 
     
Period 
    1815-1879  0.41  0.47 
1880-1904  0.17  0.20 
1905-1919  0.12  0.15 
1920-1939  0.30  0.18 
     
Life status of previous child 
    Alive  ---  0.91 
Dead  ---  0.09 
     
Age of woman 
    15-24  0.23  0.06 
25-29  0.34  0.17 
30-34  0.19  0.23 
35-39  0.11  0.22 
40-44  0.14  0.19 
45-49  *  0.12 
Parish 
    Hög  0.09  0.09 
Kävlinge  0.28  0.23 
Halmstad  0.13  0.15 
Sireköpinge  0.18  0.21 
Kågeröd  0.32  0.32 
     
Time at risk  2951.3  41640.1 
Events  1479  8367 
 
*40-44 refer to 40-49. 
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Table 5:  Relative risks of birth from piecewise constant exponential hazard 
model 
 
Basic model  Interaction model 
 
First births  Higher-order  First births  Higher-order 
 
RR  p  RR  p  RR  p  RR  p 
SES 
               
Elite  1  rc  1  rc  1  rc  1  rc 
Middle class  1.15  0.468  1.04  0.740  0.94  0.820  1.15  0.398 
Skilled  1.25  0.217  1.19  0.116  1.07  0.786  0.87  0.352 
Farmers  0.99  0.945  1.18  0.101  0.65  0.079  0.87  0.309 
Lower-skilled  1.13  0.488  1.03  0.781  0.82  0.400  0.76  0.057 
Unskilled  1.39  0.064  1.01  0.957  1.16  0.531  0.66  0.005 
                 
Period 
               
1815-1879  1  rc  1  rc  1  rc  1 
 
1880-1904  0.93  0.479  1.02  0.792  0.39  0.029  0.66  0.095 
1905-1919  0.81  0.168  0.71  0.000  0.69  0.562  0.42  0.002 
1920-1939  0.53  0.000  0.39  0.000  0.58  0.270  0.18  0.000 
                 
Age of woman 
               
15-24  1  rc  1  rc  1  rc  1 
 
25-29  0.81  0.000  0.69  0.000  0.80  0.000  0.70  0.000 
30-34  0.63  0.000  0.50  0.000  0.62  0.000  0.50  0.000 
35-39  0.35  0.000  0.35  0.000  0.33  0.000  0.35  0.000 
40-44  0.10  0.000  0.15  0.000  0.10  0.000  0.15  0.000 
45-49  ---  ---  0.02  0.000  --- 
 
0.02  0.000 
                 
Parish 
               
Hög  0.96  0.685  0.99  0.836  0.91  0.385  0.96  0.537 
Kävlinge  1  rc  1  rc  1  rc  1 
 
Halmstad  1.22  0.035  1.36  0.000  1.17  0.103  1.33  0.000 
Sireköpinge  1.08  0.352  1.42  0.000  1.03  0.741  1.38  0.000 
Kågeröd  1.19  0.024  1.46  0.000  1.13  0.124  1.43  0.000 
Year  1.00  0.903  1.00  0.193  1.00  0.524  1.00  0.140 
                 
Life status of prev. ch. 
             
Alive  ---  ---  1  rc  ---  ---  1 
 
Dead  ---  ---  2.50  0.000  ---  ---  2.49  0.000 
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Table 5:  (Continued) 
 
Basic model  Interaction model 
 
First births  Higher-order  First births  Higher-order 
 
RR  p  RR  p  RR  p  RR  p 
Interactions 
               
Middle cl*1880-
1904 
---  ---  ---  ---  2.15  0.130  0.91  0.727 
Middle cl.*1905-
1919 
---  ---  ---  ---  1.47  0.568  0.85  0.603 
Middle cl.*1920-
1939 
---  ---  ---  ---  0.73  0.555  1.36  0.336 
Skilled*1880-1904  ---  ---  ---  ---  2.14  0.095  1.83  0.022 
Skilled*1905-1919  ---  ---  ---  ---  1.25  0.733  1.56  0.140 
Skilled*1920-1939  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.66  0.419  1.93  0.037 
Farmers*1880-
1904 
---  ---  ---  ---  2.86  0.019  1.53  0.091 
Farmers*1905-
1919 
---  ---  ---  ---  2.05  0.267  1.67  0.081 
Farmers*1920-
1939 
---  ---  ---  ---  1.51  0.406  2.50  0.002 
Lower sk.*1880-
1904 
---  ---  ---  ---  3.04  0.012  1.54  0.087 
Lower sk.*1905-
1919 
---  ---  ---  ---  1.31  0.679  1.72  0.061 
Lower sk.*1920-
1939 
---  ---  ---  ---  0.95  0.913  2.05  0.018 
Unskilled*1880-
1904 
---  ---  ---  ---  2.08  0.101  1.63  0.058 
Unskilled*1905-
1919 
---  ---  ---  ---  0.62  0.465  2.55  0.001 
Unskilled*1920-
1939 
---  ---  ---  ---  0.97  0.950  3.27  0.000 
                 
Frailty variance  ---  ---  0.58  0.000  ---  ---  0.550 
 
                 
Individuals  1987 
 
13631 
 
1987 
 
13631 
 
Events  1479 
 
8367 
 
1479 
 
8367 
 
Time at risk  2951.3 
 
41640.1 
 
2951.3 
 
41640.1 
 
Chisq  906.2  0.000  9316.5  0.000  942.8  0.000  9406.5  0.000 
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Looking first at the interval between marriage and first birth in the basic model in 
Table 5, unskilled workers had higher risks (shorter first interval) than all other groups. 
Skilled workers showed similar relative risks to the unskilled, while the elite had lower 
risks relative to the unskilled (about 0.7). For higher-order births the pattern resembled 
an inverse U, with the longest intervals for the unskilled and the elite, and the shortest 
for skilled workers and farmers. Looking at period effects, there was a clear indication 
of  longer  birth  intervals  from  1905  onwards,  while  there  seems  to  have  been  little 
change before this. It should be noted that the length of the first interval is as much 
related  to  marriage  and  prenuptial  pregnancies  as  to  overall  fertility.  In  a  situation 
where  parity-specific  control  (stopping)  is  getting  increasingly  important  it  is  not 
obvious  that  the  first  interval  needs  to  be  prolonged  as  fertility  goes  down,  but 
apparently this happened in the final stages of the decline. It is clear that the death of 
the previously born child considerably increased the risk of childbirth, which shows that 
a decline in infant and child mortality might have had an impact on the fertility decline.  
Turning to the socioeconomic pattern of the decline as such, Figure 5 shows the 
net effects of period by socioeconomic status calculated from the interaction models in 
Table 5. The pre-transitional period (1815-1879) is used as the reference category in all 
comparisons. For unskilled workers relative risks refer to the main effects of period in 
the regressions, while for the other groups it is net effects of period and the interaction 
between  period  and  socioeconomic  status.  Looking  first  at  the  interval  between 
marriage and first births, all groups except farmers had considerably longer first birth 
intervals in the final period than in in the first, pointing to the increased importance of 
spacing  in  the  transition.  Some  groups,  for  example  the  elite  and  the  unskilled, 
experienced a decline in first-birth risks  for most of the period, while other groups 
showed a marked increase in the middle period before a pronounced decline began. In 
the  final  period  the  risk  of  first  birth  was  more  than  40%  lower  than  in  the  pre-
transitional period for all groups except the farmers. 
For higher-order births the decline in births risks (due to longer intervals and/or 
more stopping) had already started in the 1880s with the elite and the middle class, 
followed by the skilled and the lower-skilled workers and the farmers in the subsequent 
period (1905-1919), and the unskilled in the last period (1920-1939). The pattern is 
similar to the development of the overall marital fertility rates shown in Figure 4 above. 
Thus  is  seems  quite  clear  that  higher-order  fertility  started  to  decline  earlier  in  the 
higher  socioeconomic  groups,  even  in  this  geographically  confined  and  rather 
homogenous area. Similar early fertility declines of high status (wealthy) groups have 
been found for England and France (see Clark and Cummins 2009; Cummins 2013; see 
also Livi-Bacci 1986, on the divergence of elite groups in Europe).  
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Figure 5:  Net effects of period on fertility outcomes by socioeconomic status 
  A:  First births 
 
  B:  Higher-order births 
 
 
Note: Calculations based on Table 6, p-values for main effects and interaction effects in Table 6 
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A different aspect of the socioeconomic pattern in the fertility decline concerns 
how the socioeconomic differentials evolved as a result of the group-specific period 
trends. Figure 6 reports the net effects of socioeconomic status by period. These net 
effects were calculated from Table 6, and the difference from those in Figure 5 is that in 
this case the elite is the reference category in all periods and the relative risks and p-
values for the first period (1815-1879) refer to the base effects of socioeconomic status 
in the regression, while figures for the other periods are net effects of socioeconomic 
status and the interaction between socioeconomic status and period.  
For first birth intervals there was no clear gradient in the pre-transitional period. 
Farmers  appear  to  have  had  slightly  longer  first  birth  intervals,  but  none  of  the 
coefficients were statistically significant. In the early transition the pattern is similar, 
except for the much lower first-birth risks of the elite. Apparently they prolonged their 
intervals relative to all other groups as they started to reduce their fertility. Again, this 
points to the important role played by spacing. In the third period there was massive 
convergence in first-birth risks as the elite shortened their intervals back to their pre-
transitional levels (see Table 3). In the final period the pattern looks quite similar to the 
pre-transitional  period.  Taken  together,  the  socioeconomic  differentials  in  first-birth 
risks were similar throughout the transition, and the only dramatic change was for the 
elite. We should remember, however, that this is quite a small group, and that random 
variation due to small numbers probably explains the pattern. 
Turning to higher-order births, the pattern of the socioeconomic differentials is 
entirely  different  from  that  for  first  births.  In  the  first,  pre-transitional,  period  the 
unskilled had considerably lower fertility than the other groups, while the middle class 
and the elite had the highest. This indicates a pre-transitional pattern of higher rates of 
childbearing among the wealthier groups in society (what Clark and Hamilton (2006) 
famously  labeled  the  “survival  of  the  richest”,  see  also  Clark  and  Cummins  2009; 
Cummins 2013). During the transition the socioeconomic pattern changed as different 
groups experienced somewhat different transitions, as we saw previously. In the early 
transition (1880-1904) skilled workers and farmers had highest first-birth risks and the 
elite,  middle  class,  and  unskilled  the  lowest.  In  the  final  period  the  unskilled  and 
farmers had more than twice as high first-birth risks as the elite, while middle class, 
skilled, and lower-skilled workers had about 50% higher risks than the elite. In other 
words, late in the transition the elite had long first-birth intervals and unskilled workers 
and farmers had the shortest.   
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Figure 6:  Net effects of socioeconomic status on fertility outcomes by period 
  A:  First births 
 
  B.  Higher-order births 
 
 
Note: Calculations based on Table 6, p-values for main effects and interaction effects in Table 6. 
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8. Concluding discussion 
We started this analysis with an overview of the dominant explanations of the historic 
fertility  transition  and  a  discussion  about  what  could  be  expected  in  terms  of 
socioeconomic differentials in the transition based on these explanations. The findings 
from  the  geographically  and  culturally  homogenous  area  under  study  gave  several 
valuable insights into the process of fertility decline. 
First we demonstrated that the fertility transition involved not only parity-specific 
stopping but also prolonged birth intervals, which has also been highlighted in other 
Western fertility transitions (Anderson 1998; Bean, Mineau, and Anderton 1990; Crafts 
1989; David and Sanderson 1986; Haines 1989; Szreter 1996). This means that even 
newly married couples controlled fertility. This is consistent with the observation that 
the change in behavior was proportional to the level of fertility in all age groups for 
Sweden (Bengtsson and Ohlsson 1994). Second, we showed that the interval between 
marriage and first birth initially was shorter for lower socioeconomic strata, implying 
that the marriage and first birth decisions were tightly interlinked in this group. This is 
also found in other populations (Bengtsson and Dribe 2010), and implies that first births 
need to be analyzed separately from second and higher-order births. Third, turning to 
second and higher-order births, we showed that while elite and middle class families 
had higher fertility prior to the fertility transition, already in the 1880s it declined earlier 
than in lower status groups, and also more consistently. Skilled laborers and farmers 
followed the decades after, and low and unskilled laborers yet another few decades 
later. Thus, while fertility initially diverged in absolute terms by socioeconomic status, 
it converged somewhat at the end of the transition. In relative terms, however, a similar 
convergence did not take place, especially for higher-order births. The elite group and 
middle class were the first to start to limit their fertility, followed by skilled workers 
and farmers, and finally unskilled workers. Overall this pattern is similar to the one 
found for Sweden as a whole based on census data (Dribe and Scalone, 2014), as well 
as for the city of Stockholm in the same period (Molitoris and Dribe, forthcoming). We 
now  turn  to  the  discussion  of  how  these  findings  agree  with  the  expectations  we 
formed, based on existing theories and major empirical generalizations. 
The  early  decline  of  the  elite  seems  difficult  to  reconcile  with  several  of  the 
explanations. It seems highly unlikely that it could be explained by increased labor 
force participation of married women, and thus higher indirect costs of children, as 
women in these groups rarely worked for pay, and we have in any case no indication of 
a change in this variable for the women of this group. Similarly, it appears unreasonable 
that it could be explained by lower benefits of children stemming from either less labor 
input or increased intergenerational transfers through market or state. Children of the 
elite did not work in factories or as farm servants, and the transfers from the state did Bengtsson & Dribe: The historical fertility transition at the micro level: Southern Sweden 1815-1939 
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not begin until later and were then of greater importance to the lower classes. Also, in 
terms of the quantity-quality trade-off, we did not expect the elite to have been most 
strongly affected, because of their greater wealth and the possibility of investing in their 
children‟s education without having to limit fertility. 
There  might  have  been  some  effect  of  an  earlier  decline  in  infant  and  child 
mortality in the  middle class, but it seems far too small  to account for the fertility 
decline,  and  the  mortality  development  of  the  elite  did  not  differ  from  that  of  the 
working  classes.  Another  possible  factor,  which  has  been  discussed  in  relation  to 
declining fertility of the elite in other contexts, is changes in inheritance laws affecting 
the possibilities for the elite to transfer enough resources to their children in order to 
safeguard their social standing (e.g., Perrenoud 1990). In the Swedish case, however, 
there were no changes in this regard affecting the elite or the middle class, and we have 
no evidence of other societal changes in this period which would have made social 
reproduction  among  the  elite  more  difficult,  and  which  could  have  provided  new 
incentives to limit fertility. Hence, the only explanation fully consistent with the pattern 
of early elite decline, followed by the other social groups in a more or less hierarchical 
order, is innovation-diffusion. Even though we cannot test in a more rigorous way the 
factors explaining the decline and why some are so early and some so late, or specify in 
any greater detail what was actually diffused, the socioeconomic pattern is consistent 
with standard innovation-diffusion, where new ideas spread from the top down between 
social groups. 
Turning to the middle class, which experienced a decline somewhat later than the 
elite, the quantity-quality trade-off could potentially have been important in this group, 
which had high aspirations for children without the wealth of the elite. However, the 
actual importance of educational investments early in the transition can be questioned, 
as previously discussed, making the relevance of this hypothesis unclear for the early 
part of the decline. In a study of social mobility and attainment in the same area we 
found  no  pronounced  increase  in  middle  class  attainment  in  the  educational,  white 
collar, sector until the post-WWII period, which points to the late educational expansion 
in Sweden (Dribe, Helgertz and Van de Putte forthcoming).  
The later fertility decline among farmers, which is also evident from nation-wide 
data from micro-censuses (Dribe and Scalone 2014), could possibly be related to the 
comparatively high benefits of children working on the family farm. However, starting 
already in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, it became increasingly difficult 
for farmer children to retain their social status, as shown by increasing downward social 
mobility  in  this  group  (Dribe,  Helgertz,  and  Van  de  Putte  forthcoming;  Dribe  and 
Svensson 2008). In addition, the inheritance law of 1845, which gave equal inheritance 
to  all  children  regardless  of  sex,  changed  the  situation  for  farmers.  Having  many 
children made it difficult, if not impossible, for parents to secure a good start for them. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 17 
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The  mechanization  process  during  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  and 
concentration of  land also put pressure on investment, both among landowners and 
tenants. Taken together, this would have created incentives to limit family size among 
peasants. It could possibly explain why this process started earlier among peasants than 
workers, who rarely had anything left for their children to inherit. 
The late decline of the working class is according to expectations, as we do not 
expect educational investment to have mattered a great deal in this group, where sons 
usually aimed for similar jobs as their fathers. As workers increasingly started to work 
in the factories, and with women also increasingly working for pay (although we do not 
know  exactly  to  what  extent)  the  costs  of  bearing  and  rearing  children  increased. 
Together  with  a  quite  strong  neo-Malthusian  campaign  from  the  liberal  and  social 
democratic elite to get the working class to limit their fertility in order to improve their 
living conditions (e.g., Levin 1994), this development might have been instrumental in 
finally also changing fertility in this group.   
In conclusion, the socioeconomic pattern of the fertility transition does not appear 
fully  consistent  with  several  of  the  major  explanations,  such  as  mortality  decline, 
increased  female  labor-force  participation,  and  a  quantity-quality  trade-off.  Even 
though the latter two may have started to play more of a role in the later stages of the 
transition, it was not until the post-transitional period that they became really important, 
when  the  educational  system  and  married  women‟s  labor  force  participation  really 
expanded (see Dribe and Scalone, 2014). Mortality decline, on the other hand, might 
have been of some importance to the overall fertility decline, but cannot explain much 
of the SES-specific pattern. The socioeconomic pattern observed is, however, consistent 
with an innovation process where new ideas and attitudes about family limitation spread 
from the elite to other social groups. If this really was the explanation for the pattern 
observed is of course impossible to ascertain, but there is clearly no reason to rule it out. 
High benefits of children and comparatively low costs could also help to explain the lag 
in the decline among farmers and laborers.  
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